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IN TIMES OF MOUNTING SOVEREIGN DEBT AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS, the need for austerity and anti-
cyclical social spending (eg unemployment
insurance) reduces governments’ room for
manoeuvre when it comes to public investment.
As a consequence, government investment
spending is expected to decline in much of Europe
beyond 2010 (see Figure 1). But, the current
economic and financial crisis has also reduced the
attractiveness of private investment. Private-
sector investment fell significantly during the
crisis and is only expected to recover to 2008
levels after 2014 (see Figure 2).
In this paper we focus on one important compo-
nent of investment: infrastructure investment.
Modern economies are built on the basis of mas-
sive investments in capital intensive infrastruc-
ture. Appropriate transport, telecommunication,
water and energy networks, power plants, airports
and high-speed trains are preconditions for indi-
vidual well-being and economic growth in modern
societies. These assets share four important char-
acteristics: (1) they feature a high capital-speci-
ficity, ie they cannot be easily used elsewhere; (2)
they have long economic lifetimes (up to 60 years
for some power plants); (3) many of the corre-
sponding investments are supposed to be pro-
vided by private companies; and (4) due to their
importance for the economic development of
countries and for the externalities they generate,
governments often intervene in their provision.
The immediate effect of the crisis on private infra-
structure investment is not straightforward to
identify in the data. There is no clear trend in
investment in electricity, gas and water supply;
sewerage, waste management and remediation
activities (see Figure 3). At the same time, invest-
ment in non-residential construction and civil
engineering declined steeply after 2008, and is
not expected to recover to pre-crisis level before
2014 (apart from in the centre-north countries –
see Figure 4). Thus private investment in non-res-
idential construction and civil engineering follows
the same pattern as private investment overall.
In this Policy Contribution we distinguish the
possible channels responsible for lower private
infrastructure spending. While some of the effects
are observable in all European Union member
PRIVATE LONG-TERM INVESTMENT IN UNCERTAIN TIMES Georg Zachmann
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
East
West
Centre-north
South
United States
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
Centre-north = AT, DE, FI, DK, SE, NL; East = BG, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK, SI
South = CY, ES, GR, IT, PT; West = BE, FR, IE, LU, UK
Figure 1: Gross fixed capital formation at current
prices in euros: general government
(2005=100)
Source: European Commission AMECO database as of 7
November 2012.
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Figure 2: Gross fixed capital formation at current
prices in euros: private sector (2005=100)
Source: European Commission AMECO database as of 7
November 2012.
states, others are only present in the countries
most affected by the crisis.
LOWER BENEFITS
After 2008, the expectations for future economic
growth in many European countries were reduced
dramatically. As the consumption of telecommu-
nication, transport and energy services depends
on economic development, future demand for cor-
responding infrastructure might be less than
anticipated. Thus, some of the reduced invest-
ment in corresponding infrastructure is certainly
due to sensibly adjusted demand predictions.
Furthermore, public support for new private
infrastructure – for example new clean energy
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(see Figure 5) – was affected by actual and
expected cuts in support levels resulting from the
difficult budgetary situation.
Consequently, it is difficult to establish to what
degree reduced lending to the real-economy in
vulnerable countries (see Figure 6 on the next
page) is due to the financial sector reducing the
supply of lending, or to the real economy
demanding less capital.
HIGHER COST 
The economic crisis is also a crisis of the financial
sector. One lesson financial regulators have drawn
from the fragility of the system that was exposed
by the crisis was that more prudent lending
strategies should be required. For example, the
Basel III reform of banking regulation rules that is
set to be transposed into EU regulation and the
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Figure 3: Volumes of gross fixed capital formation in electricity, gas and water supply, sewerage,
waste management and remediation activities (2005=100)
Source: OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) Databases.
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Figure 4: Gross fixed capital formation at current
prices in euros: non-residential construction and
civil engineering (2005=100)
Source: European Commission AMECO database as of 7
November 2012.
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Figure 5: Investment in clean energy in Europe
($ billions)
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance.
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Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), which will
take effect after 2013, will increase the liquidity
and solvency requirements for financial
institutions.  In anticipation, this will inter alia force
the financial institutions to back up their long-term
lending with more capital.
While regulators responded to the fragility of the
financial sector by tightening the prudential
framework, the market also reacted by punishing
overly risky strategies. This was a probably
necessary adjustment because many market
participants perceived risks to be underpriced
before the crisis.
Some banks that were engaged in risky lending
activities faced difficulties in refinancing and had
to scale down their exposures (eg Dexia). In the
uncertain times, markets valued quickly-sellable
assets higher than long-term illiquid investments.
This ‘premium on liquidity’ makes some long-term
investments more expensive for financial
institutions compared to other assets.
Furthermore, the ‘monoline’ credit insurance
system virtually collapsed. Monoliners are
companies whose sole line of business is to
insure (typically municipal and infrastructure)
bonds. They thus essentially put a price on the risk
of default of the underlying asset. The
corresponding rates requested before the crisis
are now considered to have been overly
advantageous, and the corresponding
underpricing of risk is seen as one of the reasons
for the financial sector's difficulties.
Changes in risk-perception on the part of both
regulators and markets translate into higher costs
of capital for financial institutions lending in these
markets. The higher financing cost is passed-
through to investors and might make some
projects unprofitable that would have been
deemed (barely) profitable in 2007. At the same
time, basic interest rates are at historically low
levels. As discussed in the next section, this big
advantage in capital cost is in many countries
overcompensated for by increasing risk premia.
HIGHER RISK
While a (sensible) upward adjustment in risk
perception on the part of markets and regulators
increases the costs of long-term investment
finance, the risks themselves have also increased.
In the following, we identify three important (and
partly interlinked) sources of risk for long-term
investment, which have become more influential
because of the crisis.
First, there is no consensus on the length and
depth of the crisis. The crisis has increased
uncertainty bands for all major macroeconomic
variables (growth, unemployment, inflation,
exchange rates). If, for example, the crisis is going
to worsen in some of the peripheral countries,
reduced industrial production and labour
migration to other countries might reduce the
consumption of energy and transport services in
some countries. Consequently, demand for
infrastructure services is becoming less certain.
Furthermore, even the trust in important economic
institutions has been affected by the crisis. The
possible exit of certain countries from the euro
area, a breakup of the euro area as a whole, and
even the integrity of the single market have been
raised in the media. The crisis is perceived to have
increased the likelihood of these events and has
made investors more aware of such tail risks.
Thereby, investment in infrastructure is
particularly at risk. Because of the high capital
specificity and long economic lifetimes of such
infrastructure, it is more affected than investment
in movable and/or quickly depreciating assets.
Second, the crisis was linked to an obvious
increase in the country risk of several member
states. Downgrading of countries and increasing
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Figure 6: Euro-area lending growth to private
non-financial companies (% change)
Source: Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, November
2012.
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risk spreads clearly illustrate the dramatically
reduced trust in the abilities of national and
regional governments to repay their debts (see
Figure 7). Companies are rarely better rated than
their home countries (typically one or two notches
below). Through such ‘sovereign ceilings’,
worsening sovereign ratings directly translate into
worsening credit conditions for state-owned and
private companies. This is sensible because the
financial health of companies is contingent on the
financial health of the state. The business model
of many infrastructure projects depends on
governments’ ability to engage as a client in long-
term contracts with the provider and/or provide
(implicit) government guarantees for large-scale
projects. Furthermore, infrastructure projects with
their high capital specificity might be particularly
exposed to cascading defaults caused by a
government default (see Figure 8 for an
illustration from the 1999-2002 economic crisis
in Argentina). Lower sovereign ratings imply an
increase in the risk of countries defaulting on such
formal obligations.
Third, the political and regulatory risk for
infrastructure projects is increasing1.
Infrastructure investment is typically subject to
the time-inconsistency (Helm, 2010) of public
policies. Governments like to provide incentives
for private investment in infrastructure because it
creates jobs and improves the quality of life. In
order to attract investment, governments set up
favorable regulatory frameworks that would allow
investors to generate a positive rate of return over
the lifetime of the project. Such framework
1. On the other hand, (well)
regulated businesses are
typically less cyclical than
other industries.
conditions have manifold dimensions including
taxation, regulation of natural monopolies,
support schemes and market design.
Investment in infrastructure involves long
economic lifetimes and high capital specificity.
Consequently, governments are constantly
tempted to (implicitly) renege on their former (or
their predecessors') commitments once the
projects are completed. Investors cannot react to
'Robin Hood' taxes, retroactive changes to support
schemes, unforeseen reductions in regulated
tariffs or other measures that improve public or
final customers’ budgets as long as the
government measures are sophisticated enough
not to be in conflict with the law. Provided that the
remaining cash-flow still covers the variable cost,
investors cannot withdraw from projects without
a further loss. The main force counteracting this is
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Figure 7: Credit default swap premia in basis points (10 years)
Source: Datastream.
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that such ‘expropriatory’ measures on the part of
governments scare off future investors, or make
them demand formal guarantees and higher rates
of return to compensate them for the risk. In times
of economic crisis, such political and regulatory
risk increases. The immediate pressures of the
crisis and the general loss of credibility, make it
more likely that governments adopt changes to
the legal and regulatory framework that are
detrimental to locked-in companies. This even
makes sense from a static viewpoint, as investors
cannot respond by withdrawing, and hence
increased public income is not linked to reduced
private output (as for labour tax rates).
Overall, risk and risk perception for long-term
investments appears to have increased
substantially2. 
DISCUSSION
We argue that the economic crisis reduces the
benefits to be derived from investment in
infrastructure, while increasing both the costs and
the risks of investment. However, the size of an
eventual reduction in private infrastructure
investment and its long-term economic effect are
difficult to quantify. The scope for reasonable
public intervention is even more difficult to
establish. In fact, declining investment in
infrastructure might be for good reasons, such as
a correction of prior incorrect pricing of risk, or
sensible adjustment to revised demand.
Consequently, we restrict our conclusion to an
open discussion about the scope for public
intervention in order to bolster infrastructure
investment.
(1) Transformation in financial markets?
On-balance-sheet bank lending to infrastructure
projects has been a major source of finance for
infrastructure projects in Europe. Unlike their
counterparts in the US, Canada and Australia,
European banks have been strongly engaged in
long-term infrastructure lending, typically for the
duration of the project. Bank lending for 25 to 30
years at margins well below 100 basis points was
not exceptional. Some of the loans were
repackaged and sold on to institutions such as
Dexia and Depfa3, which are no longer there to play
2. Anecdotal evidence
reported by participants in
the 12 September 2012
Bruegel workshop on infra-
structure financing pointed
to increasing margins (from
100 to 300 basis points)
and a shortening of maturi-
ties (from more than 15
years to less than 10 years
for the same price).
3. EPEC (2010).
that role. Patterns of financial intermediation in
Europe are changing. European banks started to
withdraw from on-balance-sheet lending at very
low rates. While many market players believe that
the best match for long-term infrastructure finance
needs is long-term capital provided by the likes of
insurance companies, pension and sovereign
wealth funds, the role of banks and financial
markets in the intermediation system of the future
is still uncertain. 
Some form of institutional intermediation is likely
to be necessary as matching the timelines of two
closings (the project and the financing) with many
uncertainties does not promise stable outcomes
– the financing conditions are typically only
guaranteed for a short time-window, while the
approval of the project might take long time and is
contingent on the approved financing.
Furthermore, new projects typically do not yet
have ratings (needed by some investors, such as
insurance companies) and the structure of cash-
flows might not fit into the portfolio of an individual
long-term capital provider (insurance companies,
for example, tend to prefer fixed rates). Different,
already-existing channels might develop further:
(1) banks finance projects for some time and
refinance through the markets; (2) capital markets
establish institutions that structure infrastructure
projects into capital market products (investment
funds); (3) large companies self-finance projects
and refinance through capital markets; and (4)
sufficiently large sources of capital engage in
infrastructure projects themselves (but they will
typically only buy completed projects). It is,
however, clear that this transition will take time
because the entire system will have to move and
new capabilities will need to be built up. For
example, the presence of advanced credit-
analysis capabilities as in the US, would be a
prerequisite for scaling up long-term financing
through capital markets in Europe.
One straightforward question is if during this
transition period financing will be more difficult
and/or expensive. In this case, could public banks
assist the transition? This might happen first by
investing in knowledge (innovative legal and
financial solutions), people, and even financial
infrastructure to assist the new intermediation
system. These investments are to some degree
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public goods. Second, public banks might help to
fill a temporary financing gap for infrastructure
projects. However, a cautious approach is needed
in case public banks do ‘too much of a good thing’.
Overly well-functioning intermediation by public
banks, potentially even with (implicitly)
subsidised interest rates, might make the new
segment of long-term infrastructure finance
unattractive for private financial companies,
essentially slowing down the transformation.
(2) The fair price of risk?
Mispricing of risk has been a major cause of the
financial crisis. All discussions about reducing
private investment risk by shifting some risk from
the private sector to the public sector imply that
the privately-optimal level of risk-taking is lower
than the socially-optimal level. Considering the
previously noted time-inconsistency problem this
might well be true. The question remains: what is
the fair price of risk? Industry and policymakers
often indicate the right level to be the one at which
the projects they have in mind still happen. This
would imply that sectors that do not invest for
whatever reason need to obtain subsidised
interest rates. Such an approach is certainly
distorting.
The big challenge is how to ensure that the partly
dysfunctional financial sector in times of massive
government intervention (eg artificially reducing
the risk-spreads of certain government bonds) is
again provided with reliable signals to optimally
conduct risk-return arbitrage between different
assets and asset classes.
(3) Self-fulfilling prophecies?
To reduce the risk in different sectors, certain
strategies can be proposed. On the EU level, the
discussion about project-bonds – essentially
government guaranteed infrastructure financing
vehicles – has gained some traction, even though
the pilot-phase volumes are comparatively small
(up to €230 million4). At larger scale, a
corresponding instrument could reduce the cost
of borrowing for infrastructure projects by shifting
some of the risks from investors to the public. In
the electricity sector the introduction of capacity
mechanisms in order to remunerate power plants
4.  http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/finan-
cial_operations/invest-
ment/europe_2020/index_e
n.htm (accesed 19 Decem-
ber 2012).
not only for the energy they generate but also
their reliability are considered. This would reduce
both the price and risk for investors. Such
mechanisms are designed to provide additional
incentives for new investment.
There is a risk that at some point the discussion
about public initiative becomes self-fulfilling. If all
market actors are awaiting the implementation of
more attractive financing instruments in the near
future, they will delay projects. For the long-term
infrastructure projects discussed in this paper,
waiting for years is an option. Consequently, the
withholding of investment (anticipatory or even
strategic) might force policymakers to implement
second best policies.
(4) Economic framework for investment
Furthermore, certain industries argue that com-
petition rules and sector regulation in Europe
should recognise that the revenue situation in an
industry is important for attracting capital for
investment from increasingly global financial mar-
kets. Thus revenue growth is seen as vital to make
certain future projects viable and to improve the
ability of companies to self-finance. According to
this argument, the low financing cost before the
crisis concealed the investment-unfriendly regu-
latory framework in some industries. But with
rising financing cost, there is a risk that invest-
ment will decline. Infrastructure providers in par-
ticular outlined the investment-corrosive effects
of the legal limits to risk-mitigating devices such
as vertical integration and long-term contracts, as
well as the asymmetric (and thus highly unat-
tractive from an investor's standpoint) nature of
cost-orientated price regulation (which also tends
to undermine the scope for price segmentation).
The trade-off between static economic efficiency
and investment/dynamic efficiency gains is com-
plex, but, according to industry, the status quo
places excessive emphasis on the former at the
expense of the latter.
A particular concern in infrastructure industries is
that national regulators and policymakers do not
consider the positive spillovers of cross-border
and innovative infrastructure. If corresponding
projects are only remunerated for their direct
national benefits they might not break even and
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will thus not be provided, even though their total
benefits (including the spillovers) exceed their
costs. European funds partly addressed at
remunerating these spillovers are an important
part of the Multi-Annual Financial Framework
proposal by the European Commission (for
example, €50 billion for the Connecting Europe
Facility), though this is at risk of being severely
cut in the budget negotiations. As long as more
fundamental remedies for the structural
undervaluation of projects are not in place,
discretionary budgetary incentives such as the
Connecting Europe Facility are helpful for certain
projects with substantial positive spillovers.
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